2010, ISBN: 9048179572

[EAN: 9789048179572], Nieuw boek, [SC: 13.96], [PU: Springer Netherlands], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, Druck auf A… Más…

[EAN: 9789048179572], Nieuw boek, [SC: 13.96], [PU: Springer Netherlands], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature. 180 pp. Englisch, Books<

2010, ISBN: 9048179572

[EAN: 9789048179572], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, Druck auf Anfrag… Más…

[EAN: 9789048179572], Neubuch, [SC: 0.0], [PU: Springer Netherlands], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature., Books<

2010, ISBN: 9048179572

[EAN: 9789048179572], Neubuch, [PU: Springer Netherlands Nov 2010], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, This item is print… Más…

[EAN: 9789048179572], Neubuch, [PU: Springer Netherlands Nov 2010], BAYESIAN; INDEPENDENCEAXIOM; NON-BAYESIANDECISIONTHEORY; UTILITYTHEORY; DECISIONTHEORY; PROBABILITY, This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature. 180 pp. Englisch, Books<

2018, ISBN: 9789048179572

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: Springer Netherlands], Neuware - For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The… Más…

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: Springer Netherlands], Neuware - For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature., DE, [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, 235x155x11 mm, 180, [GW: 283g], Banküberweisung, PayPal, Internationaler Versand<

ISBN: 9789048179572

Paperback / softback. New. This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. It provides the first non-Bayesian account of normative decision the… Más…

Paperback / softback. New. This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. It provides the first non-Bayesian account of normative decision theory and includes a formal account of the framing of decision problems., 6<